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Tax Policy and Industrial Policy
Robert Couzin*
INTRODUCTION

A lain Robbe-Grillet, the French film-maker, once observed, paraphrasing Aristotle, that every good story should have a beginning, a
middle, and an end - although not necessarily in that order. So I shall
begin with my conclusion.
I believe that the role for tax policy in forging an industrial policy
is very limited, for two reasons.
The first is a matter of personal preference. This conference has,
not surprisingly, been polarized by views in favor of or against industrial policy (as well as some haggling over definition). It is not within
the scope of my remarks, or my expertise, to join that debate. However,
it is incumbent upon me to stake out a position.
Ruskin said that government and co-operation are the laws of life,
while anarchy and competition are the laws of death.1 I believe he overreacted to the seamier side of social Darwinism. I start form the proposition that government should neither manage nor restrict competition, although active steps may be required to promote competition,
and to control or balance some of its less positive side-effects. My reasons are an amalgam of those expressed by others: a philosophical view
of why we have societies in the first place, a perspective on what is
"fair" in the distribution of income and wealth among citizens, and a
bias (albeit uninformed) towards the economic arguments which favor
the market over a few smart people in a room as the best mechanism
for allocating resources and creating wealth. "Free trade" is a pleonasm; "managed trade" is an oxymoron.
Whatever I may think, of course, nations (certainly Canada) will
adopt bits and pieces of industrial policy. It is both unrealistic and
probably wrong to be a purist. Some activities of the state, including
social policy, will necessarily entail elements of industrial policy. Consider training and health care. Thus, the technical question must be
posed, whether tax policy is an appropriate and useful instrument for
achieving whatever may be the goals of the industrial policy.
The second reason for my conclusion is, therefore, a technical
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judgment, more plumbing than philosophy: I doubt that tax policy is
the right instrument to effect such industrial policy as the society may
choose. I should, however, emphasize that this is indeed a technical
matter rather than an issue of principle. I do not see any ideological
bar to using tax policy to achieve other objectives. It is legitimate for
government to examine all policy instruments in order to assess what
works best.
DEFINITIONS

Discussion is often facilitated by a definition of terms.
Tax Policy
Taxes are collected from taxpayers and spent by governments to
fulfill the textbook demands of allocating resources, stabilizing the
economy and redistributing wealth. Modern tax systems do many other
things. They change the cost of goods and services, either inadvertently
or by design. Government intervention in the economy can be fostered
or effected through the tax system. Differential prescriptions or proscriptions can mimic regulation or spending programs.
A bottoms-up notion of tax policy would begin with the basic elements of any tax system. First and foremost is the choice and definition
of the tax base (e.g. income or consumption). Second, what is the tax
mix? Which bases should be used, and in what proportions. The recipe
for extracting sufficient resources to accomplish government objectives,
while inflicting the least damage on the economy which generates those
resources, is not easy to come by. There is no accounting for tastes.
Next, what is to be the taxpaying unit (e.g. the individual or the corporation), and the rate structure? Once those are determined, a number
of technical provisions are likely to follow in an attempt to keep the
base to what was decided, to prevent the unit from flying apart (such
as through income splitting) and to protect the integrity of the rate
structure.
Our hypothetical tax system can then be judged, having regard to
the elements which it is supposed to contain and the objectives it is
supposed to serve. Simplicity, for example, is important because complexity breeds economic inefficiency and leads to tax avoidance. Equity
is another criterion for judging tax systems, reflecting a political view
that all citizens are equal (in some sense) and should be so treated.
Neutrality is another way of saying that the tax system should accomplish its objectives in a manner which does not reduce the overall efficiency of the economy more than is necessary.
The formation of tax policy can be viewed by retrospective example, namely recent trends in the OECD and in Canada. To reduce economic inefficiencies, bases have generally been broadened. Special
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treatment of certain industries has been reduced in the corporation income tax. Consumption tax has been broadened to include as many
goods and services as possible without giving rise to unacceptable (and
not correctable) regressivity. Other trends reflect not so much policy as
underlying economic reality. Corporate taxation is a reducing fraction
of the total tax mix. These trends reflect the growth of individual income and consumption, and the growing mobility of capital. This is no
place to rekindle debates on deficit financing (although I will return to
the matter below), but another trend in taxation is related to that fiscal
reality. Taxes, especially in Canada, have been going up, from thirtyone percent of GDP in 1985 to thirty-seven percent of GDP in 1992.
That, in itself, is a challenge to tax policy because economics can deal
with low rate bad taxes more easily than they can deal with high rate
bad taxes. It is surprising how preposterous and unjustifiable a tax can
be if the rate is low enough.
Industrial Policy
Even the most liberal economic systems welcome an element of
command economy during time of war. A Roman aqueduct or a Canadian transcontinental railway is a collectivization of the wealth of citizens for the good of all. Normally, although not always, "public" works
redistribute resources from the few to the many. Once the justification
for government becomes the nation state, rather than the hereditary
sovereign, expenditures on such public works, and indeed war, may be
justified either by a collective conception of the body of citizens, or
through more mundane discussions of "externalities". Even if it is in
everyone's interest to fight the war, it is not enough in any one person's
interest to give rise to the construction of tanks.
These philosophical discussions would be interesting to pursue, but
for present purposes it is probably sufficient to note that both threads
do run through modern discussions of industrial policy. It may be that
bridges and technical education are both desirable because they reflect
a national will, or it may simply be a matter of providing what people
clearly want but cannot get through normal market forces. What matters in this discussion is that governments do decide to spend our
money on such things. It is also true that the extent of such dirigisme is
relevant, and fluctuates over time.
We seem to be witnessing an upward surge. Like Zelig, suddenly
we are all playing the saxophone and talking about "infrastructure".
To restate my own position, I would severely limit the notion of industrial policy as applicable in a world of liberalized trade and free (or
"freeish") capital flows. My proposed restriction on the role of public
intervention is that it should foster the allocative miracle of market
forces, rather than the reverse. Government does have a responsibility
to correct market failures and prevent anti-competitive behavior. It will
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probably also be necessary to offset some of the undesirable results of
market allocations. I concede that such redistributive policy is "antimarket". It reflects, if you will, that root of modern society which lies
in Rousseau's compassion.
TAXES AND MARKETS

Governments intervene in markets. Over the last few decades, they
have discovered that virtually all types of intervention can, at least in
theory, be accomplished or fostered through the tax system.
Tax Expenditures
Direct spending programs are often intended to reduce the cost of
certain goods or services, either to correct for market failures, to encourage desirable behavior or to implement a social policy. Such government largesse can be delivered through what have come to be
known as tax expenditures. While tax expenditures are now a well understood facet of tax systems, governments rarely aggregate them with
ordinary expenditures, and the public tends not to perceive the total
effect of government intervention. If the state spends money both by
reducing taxes it would otherwise collect and by spending taxes it has
collected, there should clearly be a composite measure of how government actually supports industries or individuals.
A related, but different, point is that if a particular tax measure is
best regarded as indirect government spending, then it is inappropriate
to take that measure (but not direct government spending) into account
in determining an "effective tax rate". True, the marginal effective tax
rate may be a useful shorthand tool for expressing both the unadjusted
tax rate and the effect of tax-based incentives. However, it is analytically incorrect and sometimes practically misleading. A taxpayer who
claims the benefit of a tax expenditure (or a direct expenditure) is actually subject to the full statutory tax rate, and is receiving government
assistance. We do not normally calculate the effective tax rate of individuals taking into account welfare payments, or of corporations taking
into account defense contracts. If used without caution, marginal effec,tive tax rate analysis denies the robust character of tax expenditure
analysis by allowing the distinction between direct and indirect government expenditure to creep back in. As programs shift into or out of the
tax system (such as health insurance premiums) the calculated tax rate
appears, almost magically, to change.
The difficulty in identifying and measuring tax expenditures is certainly relevant to our theme. For example, one type of government intervention commonly justified by the externality argument is support
for research and development. Society contributes to private R&D
through direct government grants, government contracting with a sub-
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sidy element, government funded research organizations, government
funding through universities, procurement policies, regulated rates of
return in utility and other monopolies and, of course, tax incentives.
Any assessment of government policy towards reducing the cost of research and development by reallocation of public resources must begin
with an examination of all of these measures. Until we determine how
all government programs, taken as a whole, support (or impede) an
economic activity, we do not know what the industrial policy actually
is.

The effective tax rate issue is equally important. If research and
development incentives are tax expenditures, conscious attempts to reduce the cost of research at public expense, then it makes no sense to
describe the tax rate applicable to corporations which perform such research as being reduced by the incentive. The public perception that
tax incentives are a rip-off is persistent and resilient to information.
That perception is often promoted by governments, when it suits their
purposes.2
Effective tax rates are often cited in the comparison shopping (actual or intellectual) among tax systems. "High tax" jurisdictions such
as Canada sometimes respond to unflattering depictions of their tax
systems by pointing out, usually in a very crude way, the need for aggregation of tax and ordinary expenditures, and the misleading nature
of effective tax rates. More fundamentally, these problems of measurement prevent any serious examination of the extent and effect of industrial policy. That is not surprising. Cynics have long noted that one of
the reasons for having tax expenditures is to make such examination
more difficult.
Redistribution
Tax systems redistribute income and wealth among citizens in two
main ways: progressive rate structures, and differential exemptions or
deductions, in effect different tax bases for different people. Such measures may be promoted, and justified, on grounds other than redistribution. For example, progressive taxation has been defended on the basis
of a declining utility function of money. Medical expense credits may
be an attempt to achieve horizontal equity, based upon a "similar circumstances" test which takes health into account. In some cases there
is a redistributive provision which is not really an element of the tax
system at all. Sophisticated attempts to prevent high marginal tax rates
The recent proposals for a corporate minimum tax in Ontario are a good example. The
government finds it "unfair' that certain corporations have a low effective tax rate on book earnings, while recognizing that the low rate is the direct effect of the receipt by the corporation of tax
expenditures. There is no suggestion that the minimum tax should apply to a corporation receiving
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on working poor, for example, reflect a quite proper attempt to integrate taxation and social assistance. The social assistance is, obviously,
redistributive. The tax system is altered merely to accommodate social
policy.
It is important, although not fashionable, to distinguish between
redistribution and other reasons for progressive taxation and differential exemptions and deductions. It may well be that progressive income
taxes, wealth taxes on only a small proportion of the population, personal exemptions and integration of social and tax policy all make
sense, and are efficient, fair and democratic ways of achieving the desired redistributive justice. However, they are not the only methods
now adopted to that end. Just as it is misleading to describe the corporation receiving research and development tax credits as paying a low
rate of tax, and ignoring the other assistance that same corporation
receives outside the tax system, so the picture of the individual taxpayer is misleading and incomplete if limited to effective tax rates and
tax based redistributive measures. Why does a tax credit for medical
expenses differentially affect effective tax rates, while free hospital care
does not? Is it correct to consider the effect of a sales tax as regressive
with respect to welfare recipients if welfare payments are fully indexed? The wealthy in Canada may "get away with" reducing family
taxation by university tuition credits, but they do not seem to get away
with anything by receiving public support through subsidized university
tuition.
What does this have to do with industrial policy? The border between industrial and social policy is often unclear. Investments in
human capital (education, retraining), workfare schemes and similar
measures could be either. It is worth thinking about the aggregation
and effective tax rate issues here as well.
Taxation and Regulation
The garden variety tax expenditure reduces the relative cost of
something as determined by market forces (research, manufacturing
plant, Canadian advertising). Taxation can also be used to increase the
cost.
Such increase may be appropriate to counterbalance market inefficiencies or failures. If public funds are used to clean up a lake, and not
all taxpayers (or all taxpayers but not in the same proportions as they
pay taxes) benefitted from the activity which polluted it, price adjustment is appropriate. Carried to the extreme, were it not for technical
difficulties in designing and administering the appropriate taxes, one
might contend that almost all activities which are not regulated should,
instead, be subject to the pure price adjustment mechanism. Regulation
should be applied only to things that are "priceless". One would not
wish to tax criminal offenses instead of prohibiting them. Practically,
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regulation will still reappear where price mechanisms are simply too
complicated.
Just as it is important to aggregate tax expenditures and other
government expenditures on related programs, so should excise taxes or
negative tax expenditures be considered in the same analysis. If the
R&D company does not really have a low effective tax rate because of
the proper costing of research expenditures, given the public benefit
from those expenditures, nor does the pulp and paper company have a
very high effective tax rate when it is required to pay what would be
the market cost for its use of the environment.
THE INTERNATIONAL ELEMENT

A third dimension which must be considered before tax policy and
industrial policy meet is the implications of borders.
Neutrality
Canada and the United States are both federal-states. We should
understand better than most the conflict between sovereignty and economic efficiency. Within each country we find something approximating the free movement of goods, capital and people across borders.
There remain significant interprovincial barriers to trade in Canada,
but significant is a relative term. There are also, and always will be,
barriers to the movement of people, but at least at the sub-national
level these are not (generally) exacerbated by the law. The reason we
can achieve the degree of harmony and openness we do is because there
are values and identities shared at a higher (national) level. There is a
positive (although probably not linear) correlation between political
sovereignty and national identity, on the one hand, and economic efficiency, on the other.
So called free trade (the old term) or globalization (the new term)
are important elements in both tax and industrial policy. Americans,
naturally enough, have a different perspective than do Canadians.
When Robert Reich talks about capturing value from international
business undertakings, rather than head offices, he can only be talking
to Americans. The United States is so big that free trade within it
already produces a large proportion of what would be achieved from
world free trade. This is especially true if one adds in the cultural and
language factors which will prevent completely free movement of
goods, services, capital and labor on a global basis for the foreseeable
future. For Canada, regional or multi-lateral trade liberalization is an
important element in enhancing economic efficiency.
The "freer", if not free, movement of goods and services has made
certain demands on tax policy. The movement of people is not at all
free, due not only to legal barriers, but cultural, linguistic and practical
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ones as well. Taxation is usually overwhelmed by other factors in the
context of labor mobility. The barriers to the free movement of capital
are much lower, and in this context, there is some consensus that tax
policy is a subtle but important element.
Broadly speaking, source taxation promotes capital import neutrality, while residence taxation (coupled with full foreign tax credit) promotes capital export neutrality. Ideally, one would have both, but this
is not an ideal world.
The largest unit within which export and import neutrality may
reasonably co-exist is generally seen as the national state. It is appropriate to ask whether regional free trade zones may not subtly extend
the scope of efficiency.
Harmonization
Harmonization is a method of creeping towards export and import
neutrality at the same time. The best-known current practitioner of the
art is the European Community. North Americans love to watch their
travails. We delight in noting the difficulties they have in achieving
some types of harmonization which we already have. We point out the
obstacles they face, and underscore the time it takes them to move forward. However, their experience is somewhat different from what ours
has been or will be. Indeed, it is remarkable that a group of relatively
similar-sized economies, with diverse cultural, linguistic and historical
background can harmonize at all.
It is also worth watching how differences between EC members
can be maintained, within certain limits, through the harmonization
process.
DEBT AND DEFICIT: THE FISCAL IMPERATIVES

It is no longer possible to talk about tax or industrial policy without saying the "D" words. Our North American political emperors
have only just discovered their nakedness and, this being the twentieth
century, they cannot stop talking about it. Canadian public debt may,
in some respects represent a more serious problem than American public debt. The foreign debt proportion is higher, and the contribution of
the provinces is greater. There is also a practical dimension. The U.S.
represents a quarter of the world economy. Foreigners are unlikely to
stop lending to the U.S., although they may try to extract a higher
return. It is by no means impossible that foreigners could decide not to
lend to Canada. Indeed, to the extent foreigners view North America
as one place (and we, after all, encourage them to do that in some
respects), they may be loath to lend to the northern part, just as we
worry they would rather lend to Ontario than Saskatchewan.
The fiscal crunch is very relevant to Canadian tax policy. To the
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extent industrial policy costs money, it is also relevant to that.
WHITHER TAx POLICY

The real question is probably political and social: to what extent
can Canada retain the society its citizens (or the unelected spokespeople for those citizens) say they want, while harmonizing in a positive
manner to enhance economic efficiency and create wealth and income
for the people? My more mundane topic is the role of tax policy. I will
briefly advert to issues which are relevant in deciding whether tax policy can or should be brought to bear in the implementation of industrial policy.
(i) Administrative Issues
There are many well-known and well-worn arguments against the
use of tax expenditures to achieve government policy objectives. It is
unnecessary to round up the usual suspects. I have sympathy with the
problems of lack of scrutiny, lack of accountability (although that can
be solved, if politicians want to solve it), difficulties in measuring and
controlling expenditure, fraud, public perception, etc. Proponents of a
tax-based incentive system are quick to concede the problems and failures of the past, but argue, often persuasively, that those errors need
not be repeated. Of course, their predecessors made the same arguments equally persuasively.
(ii) The "Micro" Problem
It is hardly novel to suggest that corporate decision-making is not
exclusively a reflection of the invisible hand of economic forces. Corporations are run by people. In theory, those people should be rewarded
by their constituencies (boards of directors and shareholders) solely according to the simplest measures of economic performance. However,
this is not the case. Problems relating to short and long term profitability, the relationship between accounting earnings and economic performance, stock market perceptions, inter-personal rivalries, bureaucratic or organizational processes and other factors all weigh in the
balance. Government is not the only institution where personal advancement may reflect factors other than productivity.
Tax-based incentives can have an effect on business decisions. For
example, taxes affect the cost of capital. But more finely-targeted measures will not necessarily achieve the behavioral response imagined by
the policy-makers. The fact that industry is unresponsive, or responds
in unpredictable ways, to tax measures, is certainly a reason to be wary
of spending substantial public funds on achieving industrial policy
through such measures.
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(iii) Competition
The proposition that tax policy may have some impact on competition is not novel either. The treatment of financing charges, loss trading, reorganization rules, etc. are potentially relevant. It would be
worthwhile to look at rather more subtle uses of tax policy to support
the regulatory apparatus of competition legislation. Anti-competitive
behavior may impose a cost on society; tax policy can, in some cases,
recoup such costs. The other side of this coin, of course, is that tax
systems should not foster restraint of trade. Particularly in the interjurisdictional context, this remains a problem.
(iv) Loss Offsets
It does not require a sophisticated econometric analysis to conclude that if I have a partner who skims off a share of profits, but does
not participate to the same extent in losses, this will alter my perception of the risk/reward ratio of the venture. Tax systems provide only
moderate loss relief. Carryback and carryforward rules help, but they
are limited in time, and restricted in scope due to "loss-trading"
prohibitions. No one suggests government should not collect taxes on
profits after a change of corporate control.
It is difficult to believe that the increased cost of risk created by
the tax system has no effect on risk-taking behavior. As we struggle
with the tax base in the name of neutrality, nothing is done about loss
offsets. If industrial policy favors entrepreneurial risk, then loss relief
requires re-examination.
(v) Neutrality
The level playing field is a worn metaphor. The trite is not necessarily trivial. The type of industrial policy I fear is the hubris of bureaucrats who will try to allocate resources better than the market. Distinguishing between a policy which counter-acts market failures and
one which tries to "pick winners" is not always easy (except with hindsight, as the chosen winners rarely win). There are economic and political reasons for letting the market work, where it can work.
The economic reason is simple enough. There is a cost to intervening. The political reason is less obvious. There appear to be goods
which the market is not providing in the manner which society demands (health care, education). But we must remain vigilant as to the
limits on intervention, to preserve personal choice. It may be that the
state can provide certain goods at a competitive price; it does not follow
that it should. In some areas, government must act to provide sufficient
access to a particularly important good or service. But the modern
equivalent of the "government that governs least" is the government
that leaves the maximum of personal choice within the matrix of public
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goods and services that are necessary to the society as we define it.
So tax policy has a function is preserving, fostering and "improving" (a dangerous word) the operation of markets. It supplants them at
a cost, both economic and political.
(vi) Savings
This is an area in which tax and industrial policy often meet. The
tax system invariably presents either (or both) incentives or disincentives to saving, and differentiates between different kinds of saving. Direct incentives for, say, acquisition of domestic equities, are of questionable value, if one believes there is a global cost of capital. In that
case, the incentive may promote domestic ownership, but will not reduce the cost of equity capital to the issuing corporation. However,
clearly, attention is required to ensure that the tax system does not
discourage saving behavior.
(vii) Harmonization
I referred above to the evident benefits of tax harmonization in
achieving economic efficiency, an industrial policy few would quarrel
with. However, harmonization poses an evident political problem, since
it entails either an overt or covert relinquishment of sovereignty. The
very announcement of an intention to harmonize effectively limits future policy choice. This has been a difficulty in achieving inter-provincial harmonization in Canada.
On a North American scale, the tax harmonization issue has
raised concerns over Canadian sovereignty in general, and particularly
over social and cultural values. Canada can use its resources to promote the Canadian novel, through differential tax policies or otherwise;
however, the public must understand that there is a cost of doing so.
The debate usually centers on social policy: can Canada maintain its
distinctive social value system while harmonizing tax policy? In part,
the question is mis-directed. Much of the value system has nothing to
do with spending money, and therefore is unrelated to taxation. But
there is certainly a valid underpinning to this widely-held concern. It
relates, I believe, to redistribution.
(viii) Redistribution
The major task which confronts Canadians is to take stock of our
redistributive policies. I do not mean we should necessarily redistribute
less (although perhaps we should). But we must understand how much
is redistributed now, to whom, and at what cost. Canadians can beasked (and are asked) to pay more in order to redistribute more. The
ultimate test of our views regarding the redistributive policies of our
society is whether we stay to pay for it. Consider the following
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"thought experiment" (as physicists call it). Suppose that legal immigration restrictions into the U.S. were to disappear. Some cultural and
practical barriers to full labor mobility would remain. However, those
barriers are much lower than in Europe. How many Canadians would
not respect the categorical imperative, and vote with their feet?
Thus, we commonly say that a small, open economy must support
the incremental cost of its industrial and social policy, as compared to
its neighbors, by taxing immobile factors. Unfortunately for Canada,
the ability to extract economic rents from natural resources seems to be
declining. No factors are completely immobile. We are seeing increasing focus on consumption tax and personal income tax. Free movement
of goods takes a toll on the one. Consider what increased labor mobility
would do to the other.
This suggests that only the preservation of immobile factors will
allow a small, open economy to have significantly different redistributive policies in the long term. Consumption will surely become more
mobile if trade liberalization continues. Free trade in goods and services without free movement of labor and capital is unstable. The example of the European Community suggests that the immobility of labor will also be reduced, if not eliminated.
(ix) Human Capital
Immigration raises another difficulty. It is popular to consider that
an industrial policy which maximizes human capital is a virtuous circle.
Society will pay more for better education, and that better education
will end up producing more value for the society. Has this been true for
Ireland, or for developing countries?
(x) Debt
All of the foregoing is subject to this ultimate external restraint,
particularly in the case of Canada. An industrial policy limited to freeing up markets and correcting market failures may coincidentally (or
not coincidentally) be the only one which can co-exist with fiscal
crunch.
CONCLUSION

Where we go from here is not, paradoxically, somewhere else. We
must stay where we are, and understand what we are doing. Without a
carefully considered understanding of the current government role in
the economy, and the costs and goals of redistribution, future tax and
industrial policy will be aimless, or worse.
Yet, the process is intensely political. The electoral process seems
to overwhelm any serious attempts to discuss the tangible benefits of
harmonization, the necessity of Canadians (or Americans) paying for
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what they want over and above what their neighbors have, and the real
meaning of effective tax rates and tax expenditures. The optimist in me
suggests that public eduction is the only answer. The pessimist suggests
there is no answer.

